We study the problem of allocating $T$ sequentially arriving items among $n$ homogenous agents under the constraint that each agent must receive a prespecified fraction of all items, with the objective of maximizing the agents' total valuation of items allocated to them. The agents' valuations for the item in each round are assumed to be i.i.d.

The agents' valuations for the item in each round are

We study the problem of allocating T sequentially arriving items among n homogenous agents under the constraint that each agent must receive a prespecified fraction of all items, with the objective of maximizing the agents' total valuation of items allocated to them. The agents' valuations for the item in each round are assumed to be i.i.d. However, an added challenge here is that the agents are strategic with incentives to misreport their valuations in order to receive better allocations. This sets our work apart both from the online auction mechanism design settings which typically assume known valuation distributions and/or involve payments, and from the online learning settings that do not consider strategic agents. To that end, our main contribution is an online learning based allocation mechanism that is approximately Bayesian incentive compatible, and when all agents are truthful, guarantees a sublinear regret for individual agents' utility compared to that under the optimal offline allocation policy.

It has been shown that social institutions impact human motivations to produce different behaviours, such as amount of working or specialisation in labor. With advancement in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically large language models (LLMs), now it is possible to perform in-silico simulations to test various hypotheses around this topic. Here, I simulate two somewhat similar worlds using multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework of the AI-Economist and generative agent-based model (GABM) framework of the Concordia. In the extended versions of the AI-Economist and Concordia, the agents are able to build houses, trade houses, and trade house building skill. Moreover, along the individualistic-collectivists axis, there are a set of three governing systems: Full-Libertarian, Semi-Libertarian/Utilitarian, and Full-Utilitarian. Additionally, in the extended AI-Economist, the Semi-Libertarian/Utilitarian system is further divided to a set of three governing institutions along the discriminative axis: Inclusive, Arbitrary, and Extractive. Building on these, I am able to show that among governing systems and institutions of the extended AI-Economist, under the Semi-Libertarian/Utilitarian and Inclusive government, the ratios of building houses to trading houses and trading house building skill are higher than the rest. Furthermore, I am able to show that in the extended Concordia when the central government care about equality in the society, the Full-Utilitarian system generates agents building more houses and trading more house building skill. In contrast, these economic activities are higher under the Full-Libertarian system when the central government cares about productivity in the society. Overall, the focus of this paper is to compare and contrast two advanced techniques of AI, MARL and GABM, to simulate a similar social phenomena with limitations.

We study the problem of allocating T sequentially arriving items among n homogenous agents under the constraint that each agent must receive a prespecified fraction of all items, with the objective of maximizing the agents' total valuation of items allocated to them. The agents' valuations for the item in each round are assumed to be i.i.d. However, an added challenge here is that the agents are strategic with incentives to misreport their valuations in order to receive better allocations. This sets our work apart both from the online auction mechanism design settings which typically assume known valuation distributions and/or involve payments, and from the online learning settings that do not consider strategic agents. To that end, our main contribution is an online learning based allocation mechanism that is approximately Bayesian incentive compatible, and when all agents are truthful, guarantees a sublinear regret for individual agents' utility compared to that under the optimal offline allocation policy.

A recent theory shows that a multi-player decentralized partially observable Markov decision process can be transformed into an equivalent single-player game, enabling the application of \citeauthor{bellman}'s principle of optimality to solve the single-player game by breaking it down into single-stage subgames. However, this approach entangles the decision variables of all players at each single-stage subgame, resulting in backups with a double-exponential complexity. This paper demonstrates how to disentangle these decision variables while maintaining optimality under hierarchical information sharing, a prominent management style in our society. To achieve this, we apply the principle of optimality to solve any single-stage subgame by breaking it down further into smaller subgames, enabling us to make single-player decisions at a time. Our approach reveals that extensive-form games always exist with solutions to a single-stage subgame, significantly reducing time complexity. Our experimental results show that the algorithms leveraging these findings can scale up to much larger multi-player games without compromising optimality.

There are several theories in economics regarding the roots or causes of prosperity in a society. One of these theories or hypotheses -- named geography hypothesis -- mentions that the reason why some countries are prosperous and some others are poor is the geographical location of the countries in the world as makes their climate and environment favorable or unfavorable regarding natural resources. Another competing hypothesis states that man-made institutions particularly inclusive political institutions are the reasons why some countries are prosperous and some others are poor. On the other hand, there is a specific political theory developed for the long-term social development in Iran -- named Arbitrary Rule and Aridisolatic Society which particularly emphasizes on the role of aridity to shape arbitrary political and economical institutions in Iran, without any functional social classes in the society. In this paper, by extending the AI-Economist -- a recently developed two-level multi-agent reinforcement learning environment -- I show that when the central planner is ruling the environment by arbitrary rules, the society evolves through different paths in different environments. In the environment having band-like vertical isolated patches of natural resources, all mobile agents are equally exploited by the central planner and the central planner is also not gaining any income, while in the society having more uniformly distributed natural resources, the productivity and Maximin are higher and the society generates a heterogeneous stratified social structure. All these findings provide a partial answer to the above debate and reconcile the role of geography and political institutions on the long-term development in a region.

Credit-based congestion pricing (CBCP) has emerged as a mechanism to alleviate the social inequity concerns of road congestion pricing - a promising strategy for traffic congestion mitigation - by providing low-income users with travel credits to offset some of their toll payments. While CBCP offers immense potential for addressing inequity issues that hamper the practical viability of congestion pricing, the deployment of CBCP in practice is nascent, and the potential efficacy and optimal design of CBCP schemes have yet to be formalized. In this work, we study the design of CBCP schemes to achieve particular societal objectives and investigate their influence on traffic patterns when routing heterogeneous users with different values of time (VoTs) in a multi-lane highway with an express lane. We introduce a new non-atomic congestion game model of a mixed-economy, wherein eligible users receive travel credits while the remaining ineligible users pay out-of-pocket to use the express lane. In this setting, we investigate the effect of CBCP schemes on traffic patterns by characterizing the properties (i.e., existence, comparative statics) of the corresponding Nash equilibria and, in the setting when eligible users have time-invariant VoTs, develop a convex program to compute these equilibria. We further present a bi-level optimization framework to design optimal CBCP schemes to achieve a central planner's societal objectives. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments based on a case study of the San Mateo 101 Express Lanes Project, one of the first North American CBCP pilots. Our results demonstrate the potential of CBCP to enable low-income travelers to avail of the travel time savings provided by congestion pricing on express lanes while having comparatively low impacts on the travel costs of other road users.

We study the problem of allocating $T$ sequentially arriving items among $n$ homogeneous agents under the constraint that each agent must receive a pre-specified fraction of all items, with the objective of maximizing the agents' total valuation of items allocated to them. The agents' valuations for the item in each round are assumed to be i.i.d. but their distribution is a priori unknown to the central planner. Therefore, the central planner needs to implicitly learn these distributions from the observed values in order to pick a good allocation policy. However, an added challenge here is that the agents are strategic with incentives to misreport their valuations in order to receive better allocations. This sets our work apart both from the online auction design settings which typically assume known valuation distributions and/or involve payments, and from the online learning settings that do not consider strategic agents. To that end, our main contribution is an online learning based allocation mechanism that is approximately Bayesian incentive compatible, and when all agents are truthful, guarantees a sublinear regret for individual agents' utility compared to that under the optimal offline allocation policy.

We investigate the use of multi-agent allocation techniques on problems related to Earth observation scenarios with multiple users and satellites. We focus on the problem of coordinating users having reserved exclusive orbit portions and one central planner having several requests that may use some intervals of these exclusives. We define this problem as Earth Observation Satellite Constellation Scheduling Problem (EOSCSP) and map it to a Mixed Integer Linear Program. As to solve EOSCSP, we propose market-based techniques and a distributed problem solving technique based on Distributed Constraint Optimization (DCOP), where agents cooperate to allocate requests without sharing their own schedules. These contributions are experimentally evaluated on randomly generated EOSCSP instances based on real large-scale or highly conflicting observation order books.